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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNO-
TATED WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**
Topic C. Consideration and Its Sufficiency.
Section.
7 5. Definition of consideration.
76. What acts or forbearances are sufficient consideration.
77. A promise is generally sufficient consideration.
73. A promise is insufficient consideration if its performance would
obviously be insufficient.
79. A promise in the alternative as consideration.
80. A promise which is not binding is generally insufficient consid-
eration.
81. Adequacy of value of consideration is immaterial.
82. A recital of consideration is not conclusive proof.
43. One consideration may support a number of promises.
84. Application of rules to a number of special cases.
Section 75. DEFINITION OF CONSIDERATION
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal
relation, or
(d) a return promise.
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
(2) tConsideration may be given to the promisor or to some
*This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Re-
statement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky, in co-operation
with the Kentucky State Bar Association.
**Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana; S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ.; Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-29; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law since 1930.
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other person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other
person.
Comnment:
a. Th.e law generally imposes no duty on one who makes
an informal promise unless the promise is supported by sufficient
consideration (see Section 19.)
b. This Restatement distinguishes the two questions:
whether there is consideration for a promise, and whether that
consideration is sufficient.
Anrotation:
Subdivision (1). With few exceptions, the Kentucky decisions
have not followed the simple method proposed here in defining con-
sideration apart from its sufficiency. Our definitions of "considera-
tion" are generally attempts to define "sufficient consideration" and
are of little practical value because of the generality of the terms
used and of the loose language employed. The traditional benefit-
detriment definition has been constantly repeated and subject to the
usual qualifications that the words are used in the legal sense only.
(Wallace v. Cook, 190 Ky. 262, 227 S. W. 279). A better definition, and
one more in accord with this and the following sections, has been ap-
proved in a few cases; "There is consideration if the promisee in re-
turn for the promise does anything legal, which he is not bound to do,
or refrains from doing anything, which he has a right to do." Brady
v. Equitable Trust Co., 178 Ky. 693, 199 S. W. 1082; Bank of St. Helens
v. Mann's Ext., 226 Ky. 381, 11 S. W. (2d) 144; Gannon v. Bronston.
246 Ky. 612, 55 S. W. (2d) 358 (Citing this section). Recent definitions
have mistakenly spoken of consideration as the motive or inducement to
contract (See Section 84-2 inlra). Despite the language used, the de-
cisions involving consideration have been, on the whole, sound and
support this definition by recognizing forbearance and all the acts
stated here as consideration. There is much talk in the earlier cases
concerning love and affection or other "good consideration" in execu-
tory contracts, but this is definitely settled by Su~livan, v. Sullivan, 122
Ky. 707, 92 S. IV. 966.
This section requires that, in order to be consideration, the act or
forbearance must be bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise. Many of our recent definitions have included this in the
statement that consideration is the "price" of the promise. See Green-
wade v. Pirst Nat'l. Bank, 240 Ky. 60, 41 S. IV. (2d) 369; Cassinell! v.
Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, 38 S. W. (2d) 980. For this reason, if the act or
forbearance precedes the promise it is not consideration (See Section
53). A promise to indemnify a surety when made on the sole consid-
eration of, but after, the relation is created is not enforceable. Moore
v. Kuster, 238 Ky. 292, 37 S. IV. (2d) 863; Daviess County Bank v.
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Wright, 33 K. L. R. 457; 110 S. W. 361; Hofloway's Assignee v. Rudy.
22 K. L. R. 1406, 60 S. W. 650. In the same way the promise of the
payee of a note, made after receiving the note (Western Silo Co. v.
Johnson, 203 Ky. 704, 262 S. W. 1093), a promise by one of the parties
to a contract if made-after the contract is complete (E. F. Spears &
Sons v. Winkle, 186 Ky. 585, 217 S. W. 691), the promise of a landlord
after a lease is signed (King & Metzger v. Cassell, 150 Ky. 537, 150 S.
W. 682), or a promise by the buyer of property to pay more (Howard
N. McNeil, 25 K. L. R. 1394, 78 S. IV. 142) or a warranty by the seller
(Waiters v. Akers, 31 K. L. R. 259, 101 S. W. 1179) if made after the
contract and conveyance is complete, are all unenforceable unless sup-
ported by other consideration.
A moral duty is not consideration. Smith v. Wager's Admr., 238
Ky. 609, 388 W. (2d) 685 (promise of father to provide for illegiti-
mate child out of estate); Mercer v. Mercer's Admr., 87 Ky. 30, 7 S. W.
401 (promise of father to support an illegitimate child); Montgomery
iv. Lampton, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 519 (promise to pay a debt after compo-
sition with creditors). However, there are several cases, especially
the earlier ones, that seemingly adopt the idea of moral consideration
or at least do not require a pre-existing legal obligation. Clarke v.
McFarland, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 45; Gardner Price & Co. v. Towsey, 13 Ky.
(3 Litt.) 423 (promise by former debtor to one who has voluntarily
paid off the debt); Campbell v. Young, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 240 ("Affirm-
ing" a contract that was void because made on Sunday). See also
T'iley v. Pettit, 96 Ky. 576, 29 S. W. 438 (promise by one who has ap-
cepted voluntary services by another).
Although the later cases frequently speak of "moral considera-
tion," it is clear there must have been a pre-existing legal obligation,
although now voidable or unenforceable. (Sections 85-94 infra). Gil-
bert v. Brown, 123 Ky. 703, 97 S. W. 40. However, one having paid a
moral obligation cannot recover the payment. Weihing v. Kurfes, 12
K. L. R. 893.
Subdivision (2). Consideration for a promise may be given to
one other than the promisor. Brady v. Equitable Trust Co., 178 Ky.
693, 199 S. W. 1082; Miller v. Davis, 168 Ky. 661, 182 S. W. 839; Allcn
v. Pryor, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. M.) 305; Howard v. Lawrence, 23 K. L. R.
680, 63 S. W. 589. (But see Rasnick v. Ritter Lbr. Co., 187 Ky. 523, 219
S. W. 801). Or it may be given by one other than the promisee. Wil-
liamson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282, 15 S. W. 660; Reynold's Admr. v. Reynolds,
92 Ky. 556, 18 S. W. 517; Farrow v. Turner, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. M.) 495. An
accommodation maker of a negotiable instrument Is liable to the
holder for value. K. S. 3720b-29; Howard v. So. Nat'l Bank, 204 Ky. 71,
263 S. W. 719.
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Section 76. WHAT ACTS OR FORBEARANCES ARE SUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION.
Any consideration that is not a promise is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Section 19 (c), except the following:
(a) An act or forbearance required by a legal duty that is
neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable
dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or to the
public, or, if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed
to any person;
(b) The surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid
claim or defense by one who has not an honest and reason-
able belief in its possible validity;
(c) The transfer of money or fungible goods as considera-
tion for a promise to transfer at the same time and place a
larger amount of money or goods of the same kind and
quality.
Annotation:
This section relates only to acts other than promises and makes
the general statement that all acts (bargained for and given in ex-
change for the promise) are sufficient consideration unless they fall
within one of the three stated exceptions. The Kentucky decisions are
In accord with the general statement and exceptions.
Subsection (a). The Kentucky decisions hold that if the legal
duty Is not doubtful nor the subject of an honest and reasonable dis-
1pute, its performance is not sufficient consideration. This is true
when it is a contractual duty owed to the promisor. Payment of part
of an undisputed debt then due is not sufficient to support a promise
to forgive the remainder. Call v. Pinson, 180 Ky. 367, 202 S. W. 883
(promisee's insolvency and fact promisor gave a receipt "in full" are
immaterial); Black v. O'Hara, 175 Ky. 623, 194 S. W. 811; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Van Meter's Adrn., 137 Ky. 4, 121 S. W. 438 (acceptance
of check marked "in full settlement"). Nor is it sufficient to support
a promise extending the time for payment of the remainder. Tudor Y.
Security Trust Co., 163 Ky. 514, 173 S. WV. 1118. Completion of work
according to a contract is not sufficient consideration for a promise to
pay additional compensation: Combs v. Burt & Brabb Lbr. Co., 27
K. L. R. 439, 85 S. W. 227. But, of course, this does not apply where
the contract is such that it could be set aside in equity because of
fraud or mistake. John King & Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 131 Ky. 46,
114 S. V. 308. Also, if the duty is imposed by law and owing either to
the promisor or the public-the performance is not sufficient consid-
eration. A peace officer cannot collect a reward if his act is done within
the line of duty. Benton v. Kentucky Bankers' Assn., 211 Ky. 554, 277
S. W. 358; Mason v. Manning, 150 Ky. 805, 150 S. W. 1020. See also
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Trundle's Adm. v. Riley, 56 Ky. (17 B. M.) 396. (Promise to pay jailor
for services to prisoner). Since the acts themselves are not sufficient
consideration, a promise to do the acts would not be sufficient. Watts
v. Parks, 25 K. L. R. (1908), 78 S. W. 1125; Section 78, infra.
If the act requested and performed differs from the legal duty it is
sufficient consideration. Section 84 (c) infra. As to the performance
of a contractual obligation to a third person, see Section 84 (d), infra.
Subsection (b) requires an honest and reasonable belief in the
claim. All of our many decisions require an honest belief in the claim,
"a bona fide dispute," and the surrender of an Invalid claim that is not
asserted in good faith is never sufficient. Creutz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 429,
12 S. W. 926; Mills v. O'Daniel, 23 K. L. R. 73, 62 S. W. 1123. The
language in a few cases, such as Barr v. Gilmour, 204 Ky. 582, 265
S. W. 6 and Ripy Bros. Distilling Co. v. Lillard, 149 Ky. 726, 149 S. W.
1009, implies that good faith alone may be sufficient, but in these cases
the claim, altho perhaps invalid, was at least doubtful. Other cases
emphatically deny that good faith alone is sufficient and show a ten-
dency to apply an objective as well as a subjective test. Some of the
decisions have gone to the extreme in saying that the claim must be
doubtful, and to be doubtful it must be one about which well informed
lawyers and judges might easily differ. Robb v. Sherrill-Russell Lbr.
Co., 194 Ky. 835, 241 S. W. 64; Simmons v. Hunt, 171 Ky. 397; 188
S. W. 495; Gray v. U. S. Savings & Loan Co., 116 Ky. 967, 77 S. W. 200;
Bunnell v. Bunnell, 111 Ky. 566, 64 S. W. 420. The most recent deci-
sion says that the claim must not be "wholly or certainly groundless."
Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173, 27 S. W. (2d) 695. But an examina-
tion of the decisions indicates that the court does not inquire into the
actual merits of the suit forborne or claim surrendered and that the
real test is not the validity of the claim, but the reasonableness of the
belief, that the claim may be certainly groundless, but it must not be
clearly so to a reasonable man at that time. It is really an objective
test of good faith. Sellers v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458, 175 S. W. 1002; For-
sythe v. Rexroat, supra; Hardin's Adm. v. Hardin, 201 Ky. 310, 250
S. W. 417; Western, etc. Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 130 Ky. 397, 113 S. W.
456; Berry v. Berry, 183 Ky. 481, 209 S. W. 855. A claim is looked at
as a whole, and payment of a part which is admittedly due and not dis-
puted is consideration for the promise to release the remainder. Cul-
ningham v. Standard Const. Co., 134 Ky. 198, 119 S. W. 765. Alcorn v.
Arthur, 230 Ky. 509, 20 S. W. (2d) 276. (Ignorance of facts or failure
to investigate will not affect the question of "good faith").
Subsection (c): No Kentucky cases.
Section 77. A PROMISE IS GENERALLY SUFFICIENT CON-
SIDERATION.
Except as qualified by Sections 78, 79, and 80, any promise
-whether absolute or conditional is a sufficient consideration.
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Annotation:
Section 76 was concerned with the sufficiency of consideration in
unilateral contracts and this section deals with consideration in bilat-
eral contract, and is in accord with the law of Kentucky. Weatherford
v. Boulware, 102 Ky. 466, 43 S. W. 729. Mutual promises are sufficient
to support each other. Carter v. Hall and Martin, 191 Ky. 75, 229 S.
W. 132; Elkhorn Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Eaton, 163 Ky. 306, 173
S. W. 798. This is true, altho one of the promises is conditional.
Kernam v. Carter, 31 K. L. R. 865, 104 S. W. 308 (dictum).
Section 78. A PROMISE IS INSUFFICIENT CON IDERATION I'
ITS PFRFORMANCE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INSUFFICIENT.
A promise is insufficient consideration if the promisor knows
or has reason to know at the time of making the promise that it
can be performed by some act or forbearance which would be in-
sufficient consideration for a unilateral contract.
Annotation:
Kentucky decisions are in accord: Watts v. Parks, 25 K. L. R.
(1908), 78 S. W. 1125 (Promise to pay a debt then due); Eblin v.
Miller's ,x'r., 78 Ky. 371 (Promise not to abandon a lease); Ford v.
Crens.haw, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 68 (Promise to perform a contractual duty
owing to a third person).
Section 79. A PROMISE IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS CONSIDERA-
TION.
A promise or apparent promise wbhich reserves by its terms
to the promisor the privilege of alternative courses of conduct is
insufficient consideration if any of these courses of conduct would
be insufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for.
7omment:
a. This Section is applicable to two classes of promises.
In one class the promisor undertakes to give any one of several
performances, each of which is in a greater or less degree an
object of desire to the promisee. In the other class of cases one
performance only is an object of such desire, but another course
of conduct by the terms of the promise is permissible to the
promisor in case he deems it for his advantage to adopt that
course. In both cases the promise is sufficient consideration if it
cannot be kept without some action or forbearance which would
be sufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for.
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Annotation:
No cases have been found where the promisor agrees to do one of
two or more things desired by the promisee. In our cases there is a
promise to do the one thing desired by the promisee, but the promisor
reserves the right to avoid the consequence of his promise by doing
something else. Our courts have, without discussion, sustained the
validity of contracts involving such promises where the performance
of the alternative is a detriment to the promisor, or, as stated here,
where the alternative would be sufficient consideration if it alone were
bargained for. Shaw v. Hudson Engineering Co., 155 Ky. 4, 159 S. W.
653 (Promise to employ as long as the employer used patent rights
assigned by the employee); Bridgeford & Co. v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479,
139 S. W. 750 (as long as employing corporation is in existence); Yel-
low Poplar Lbr. Co. v. Rule, 106 Ky. 455, 50 S. W. 685 (as long as em-
ployer continued in business on the Ohio River).
On the other hand, if the alternative is such that its performance
would not be a detriment to the promisor or a benefit to the promisee,
that is, such that its performance would not be sufficient consideration
if it alone were bargained for, the promise containing such an alterna-
tive is not sufficient consideration. Such a promise is illusory since it
creates no obligation. Neither party would be entitled to the assist-
ance of a court of equity.: Goff v. Saxon, 174 Ky. 330, 192 S. W. 24
(Promise to pay for doing such work as the promisor shall assign);
Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S. W. 662 (Lease determinable
at will of lessee). Berry v. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W. 558 (dictum-
lease is not binding on lessor).
Law courts deny the validity of such an agreement to the extent
that it is executory and have borrowed from the language of equity
in saying that the agreement is "unenforceable" because "wanting In
mutuality" which in this case means no more than saying that the
executory agreement is invalid because of lack of consideration. Other
decisions speak of these agreement; as "unenforceable because un-
ilateral" which means the same thing. It has been frequently said:
"Where it is left to one of the parties (to an executory bilateral agree-
ment) to choose whether he will proceed or abandon the contract, and
he may do this at any time without incurring any liability thereunder,
the contract is not binding on either." Combs v. Hazard. Ice and Stor-
age Co., 218 Ky. 29, 290 S. W. 1035; Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co.
v. Zeigler, 196 Ky. 414, 244 S. W. 899 (Promise to pay commissions
on purchases for a definite period, but the employer reserved the right
to determine the amount of the purchases); Daniel Boone Coal Mining
Co. v. Miller, 186 Ky. 561, 217 S. W. 666 (Mineral lease with right in
lessee to abandon at his discretion); Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker Co.,
156 Ky. 6, 160 S. W. 777 (If any buyer has the right to refuse any
or all of the goods which "for any unforseen reason" he finds he can-
not use the seller ig not bound to supply any goods). Louisville & N.
R. R. Co. v. Offut, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S. W. 181 (Promise to employ as long
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as employee did faithful and honest work is determinable at will of
either). See also Rodgers v. Larrimore & Perkins, 188 Ky. 468, 222
S. W. 512; Ross-Traughan Tobacco Co. v. Johnson, 182 Ky. 325, 206 S. W.
4S7.
Although the promise is illusory and creates no executory obli-
gation on either side, there may be a recovery under the agreement
in so far as it has been executed before notice of termination. Elk-
horn Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Eaton, 163 Ky. 306, 173 S. W. 798;
Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Offutt,, supra; Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker,
supra. In this the agreement may be compared to agreements which
have no executory effect because of indefiniteness, see Section 33, supra.
A promise to buy the amount of goods one "needs" or "requires"
is not objectionable since the amount does not depend on the want,
wish or will of the promisor. Louisville Tob. Warehouse Co. v. Zeig-
7er, supra (obiter), and the same may be said of a promise to do what
the promisor can or is able to do. Ayer Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bannon., 164
Ky. 34, 174 S. W. 783; Mitchell-Taylor Tie Co. v. Whitaker, 158 Ky. 651,
166 S. W. 193; Kelly v. Peter & Burghad Stone Co., 130 Ky. 530, 113
S. W. 486.
There has been a marked tendency to interpret these promises so
as to make them mutually obligatory where possible either by ignoring
words that would defeat the validity of an oral agreement. Ayer and
Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bainon, supra ("could or would" Interpreted a
"could"), or by reading in a promise to perform the part that would
make the agreement optional. The latter has been used particularly
in the interpretation of mineral leases. Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky.
345, 151 S. W. 662 (rent payable in share of the products implies a
promise to begin operations within a reasonable time and to carry
them on diligently). Berry v. Frisbie, supra (same). See also Bell
v. Hatfield, 121 Ky. 560, 89 S. W. 544. If the same implication had
been made in Goff v. Saxon and some of the other cases cited above a
more desirable result would have been reached.
Section 80. A PROMISE WHICH IS NOT BINDING IS GEN-ERAL-
LY INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION.
Except as stated in Section 84 (e), a promise which is
neither binding nor capable of becoming binding by acceptance
of its terms is insufficient consideration, unless its invalidity is
caused by illegality due solely to facts that the promisor neither
knows nor has reason to know.
Aiinotatioiz:
Kentucky decisions are in accord with this section. Combs v. Haz-
ard Ice & Storage Co., 218 Ky. 29, 290 S. W. 1035; Second National
Bank v. Rouse, 142 Ky. 612, 134 S. W. 1121, Rehmr-Zeiher Co. v. Walker
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Co., 156 Ky. 6, 160 S. W. 777. It is generally said "if one party is not
bound, neither is bound." Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76, 263 S. W. 717 (If
a promise by a married woman to sell land is void, she cannot enforce
the promise to buy, even after discoverture); Farmers' Bank v. Wi7-
liams, 205 Ky. 261, 265 S. W. 771 (If the agreement is void it cannot be
"ratified" after the disability is removed unless there is new consid-
eration); Duncan v. Reed, 47 Ky. (8 B. M.) 382 (A promise to pay
a usurious rate of interest will not support a promise to extend time),
Anderson v. lannon, 46 Ky. (7 B. M.) 217 (same) .
The exception in case of illegality would apply to acts as well as
promises and allows a recovery on the contract by a party not in par
delicto. Our Court has said, "Where a party to a contract, who is in-
nocent of any unlawful purpose in making the contract, seeks to have
it enforced, it cannot be avoided by the other party on account of the
unlawful purposes. . . .which he did not disclose." Fears v. United
Loan & Deposit Bank, 172 Ky. 255, 189 S. W. 226.
Section 81. ADEQUAkCY o VALUR op CONSIDEATimN IS
IMMATERIA,.
Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 76, 78, 79, and
80, gain or advantage to the promisor or loss or disadvantage to
the promisee, or the relative values of a promise and th.e con-
sideration for it, do not affect the sufficiency of consideration.
Annotation:
"A valuable consideration, however small, is sufficient to sustain
a contract." Price's Admx. v. Price's Admx., 111 Ky. 771, 785, 66 S. W.
529 (Promise to pay an annuity of $250 is sufficient to sustain a prom-
ise to release a debt of $4,000, althoug. the annual payment was only
slightly in excess of the legal interest); Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Heath,
26 K. L. R. 19, 80 S. W. 502 (Payment of two dollars sufficient to sus-
tain agreement to release claim for damages against the railroad com-
pany); Thornberry's Admr. v. Dis, 80 Ky. 241 (Payment of taxes
amounting to $19.90 sufficient to support a promise to pay a much
larger debt owing to the promisee); Miller v. Davis, 168 Ky. 661, 182
S. W. 839 (Promise, by purchaser of partnership interest to pay the
previous debts of the partnership to prevent attachment, is binding,
altho the promisor received no benefit from the act).
"The adequacy of the consideration can not be inquired into, but
the want of any consideration whatever may be." Gray v. U. S. Sav-
ings & Loan Go., 116 Ky. 967, 971, 77 S. W. 200. This is a distinction
between sufficiency and adequacy. The giving up of a void note is not
consideration for a renewal note. Gilbert v. Brown, 123 Ky. 703, 97
S. W. 40.
Adequacy of consideration may be important when the aid of
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equity Is sought. Lexington & E. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 183 Ky. 343,
209 S. W. 59. Although it is said that inadequacy of consideration alone
will not be sufficient cause for rescinding a contract; Matthis v.
O'Brien, 137 Ky. 651, 126 S. W. 156; Lee's Exr. v. Lee, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.)
134. Or for denying specific performance. Darnell v. Alexander, 178 Ky.
404, 199 S. W. 17. It is evidence of fraud and when connected with
other circumstances it will be sufficient in either case. Inter-Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. ,tephenson, 246 Ky. 694, 56 S. W. (2d) 332.
Kentucky seemingly has a peculiar doctrine in regard to mineral
options, since Litz v. Goosling, 93 Ky. 185, 19 S. W. 527, it is clear that
consideration of one dollar is not sufficient to sustain these agree-
ments. Thompson & Co. v. Reid, 31 Y L. R. 176, 101 S. W. 964; Noble
v. Mann, 32 K. L. R. 30, 105 S. W. 152; Berry v. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337,
86 S. W. 558; Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S. W. 662 ($5 re-
cited consideration); Stamper v. Combs, 164 Ky. 773, 176 S. W. 178.
It is said in these cases that the consideration is "insignificant" or "so
flagrantly disproportionate to the value of the privilege .... that the
parties could not have regarded it in any sense as an equivalent."
However, it appears in some of the cases that the consideration was
never paid and it might be said that the objection is not the inade-
quacy of the consideration, as much as it is to the fact that it was
merely nominal. At least the doctrine is not extended to other op-
tions. Sparks v. Ritter, 204 Ky. 623, 265 S. W. 26 ($2 suffiient to sup-
port an option to convey land for a right of way within 25 years).
The amount of the consideration is important in some actions. In
an action on an assignment of a writing, the amount recoverable by
the assignee is limited to the consideration actually paid for the as-
signment. Y S. 475. But see K. S. 3720b-66 as to the liability of an
Indorser of a negotiable instrument. A devisee assuming debts of the
ancestor or expressly promising to pay them is probably not bound in
an amount in excess of the value of the property received. K. S. 2084;
Withers' Adm. v. Withers' Heirs, 30 K. L. R. 1099, 100 S. W. 253;
Grimes v. Grimes, 28 K. L. -R. 549, 89 S. W. 548.
Section 82. A RECITAL OF CONSIDERATION iS NOT CONCLUS-
IYE PROOF.
A recital in a written agreement that a stated consideration
other than a promise has been given as consideration is not con-
clusive proof of the fact.
Comment:
a. The parol evidence rule does not prevent denial of the
truth of statements of fact contained in a written agreement, ex-
cept statements that the promises contained in the agreement
have been made. The rule forbids (see Section 238) proof 'that
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a promise stated in a7 written agreement was not made in those
terms.
Annotation:
"The consideration of any writing, with or without seal, may be
impeached or denied by pleading verified by oath." K. S. 472. The true
consideration may be shown, although it contradicts that stated in a
contract or deed. Wilson v. Mitchell, 245 Ky. 60, 53 S. W. (211) 175;
Apple v. McCullough, 239 Ky. 74, 38 S. W. (2d) 955; Ecton v. Flynn, 229
Ky. 476, 17 S. W. (2d) 407; Newton v. Newton's Adm., 214 Ky. 278, 283
S. W. 83; Mcaray v. Corn, 168 Ky. 457, 182 S. W. 640. It is said that
the reason for this rule is that the true consideration is not material
to the validity of a written contract, but may or may not be material to
the parties. Steele v. Hinkle, 205 Ky. 408, 265 S. W. 931. However, the
recited consideration is prima facie correct and is to be considered.
O'Neal v. Tuney's Exr'x., 222 Ky. 361, 300 S. W. 913.
Section 83. ONE CONSIDERATION MY SUPPORT A NumBm
OF PROMISES.
Consideration is sufficient for as many promises as are bar-
gained for and given in exchange for it if it would be sufficient:
(a) for each one of them if that alone were bargained for, or
(b) for at least one of them, and its insufficiency as con-
sideration for any of the others is due solely to the fact that
it is itself a promise for which the return promise would not
be a sufficient consideration.
Annotation:
(a) That a single consideration will support as many promises
as are bargained for if it would be sufficient for each of them alone is
illustrated by the guaranty cases where the extension of credit is suf-
ficient to support both the promise of the debtor and that of the
guarantor. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Patterson, 137 Ky. 180,
125 S. W. 287; Allen v. Pryor, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. M.) 305. Or the prom-
ise of the tenant is sufficient consideration for the many promises
made by the landlord, including an option to purchase or even an
agreement to rescind under certain conditions. Bank of Louisville v.
Baimiester, 87 Ky. 6, 7 S. W. 170; Montanus v. Buschmeyer, 158 Ky.
k53, 164 S. W. 802. Payment, or the promise to pay, of the purchase
price is consideration for the many covenants by a vendor. Jones v.
Waggoner's Adm., 30 Ky. (7 J. 3. M.) 144.
Subsection (b) would be illustrated by cases holding A's promise
sufficient consideration for two or more promises by B, although B was
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already bound to perform one of the acts promised. This exact situa-
tion does not seem to have arisen, but it is comparable to the cases
where B's promise is to do the thing he was previously bound. to do,
but at a different time. BelZ v. Pittman, 143 Ky. 521, 136 S. W. 1026. See
other cases cited under Section 84 (c) infra.
Section 84. APPLICATION OF RuLES TO A NUMBER OF SPECIAL
CASES.
Consideration is not insufficeint because of the fact
(a) that obtaining it was not the motive or a material
cause inducing the promisor to make the promise, or
(b) that part of it does not fulfl the requirements of
sufficiency, or
(c) that the party giving the consideration is then bound
by a duty owed to the promisor or to the public, or by any
duty imposed by the law of torts or crimes, to render some
performance similar to that given or promised, if the act
or forbearance given or promised as consideration differs in
any way from what was previously due, or
(d) that the party giving the consideration is then bound
by a contractual or quasi-contractual duty to a third person
to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as con-
sideration, or
(e) that it is a promise, and a special privilege not ex-
pressly reserved in the promise but given by the law, makes
the promise or the whole agreement unenforceable are void-
able, or
(f) that it is a promise, performance of which is conditional
on either a future or past event, if when the promise is made
there is any possibility, or there would seem to a reasonable
man in the position of the promisor to be any possibility,
that the promise can be performed only by some act or for-
bearance which would be sufficient consideration.
Annotation:
(a) Although it has been frequently said that consideration is
the "motive or inducement to contract"... Bowman v. Vandiver, 243 Ky.
139, 47 S. W. (2d) 947; Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, 38 S. W. (2d)
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980; Farmers' Bank v. Williams, 205 Ky. 261, 265 S. W. 771 .... this is
merely a recognition of the fact that the two are generally identical.
In Spears & Song v. Winkle, 186 Ky. 585, 217 S. W. 691, the terms in-
ducements and considerations, are defined and distinguished and it Is
held that an inducement is not necessarily the consideration for a
promise. It is apparent that the converse of this would be true and
that an act could be sufficient consideration although obtaining it was
not the reason for the promise. The court has never looked into the
actual inducement and there are many cases allowing insignificant acts
to support valuable promises, and where it is clear that the act itself
did not furnish the motive for the promise. For an example see
Sparks v. Ritter, 204 Ky. 623, 265 S. W. 26 (holding an option on land
for a period of 25 years is supported by payment of $2.00).
(b) Murray v. Meagher, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 574 accord. A plea that
part of the consideration has failed is bad. Willett v. Forman, 26 Ky.
(3 J. J. M.) 292;Wallace v. Barlow's Adm., 6. Ky. (3 Bibbs.) 168. But if
part of the consideration is illegal and vicious the whole contract is
void. Fears v. United Loan and Deposit Bank, 172 Ky. 255, 189 S. W.
226; Averbeck'v. Hall, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 505.
(c) Section 76 (a) states that performance of a duty then legally
owing to the public or promisor is not sufficient consideration. This
subsection states that if the promise or performance differs in any way
from that which was previously due it may be sufficient consideration.
This is really a corollary of subsection (b) above, and is in accord with
the decisions in this state. Bell v. Pitman, 143 Ky. 521, 136 S. W. 1026
(Promise to pay a note before due is sufficient consideration for prom-
ise to accept less than the face of the note as payment); Price v. Price,
111 Ky. 771, 64 f. W. 746 (Agreement to pay In Installments); Murray
v. Meagher, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 574 (Promise to pay an additional sum is
supported by acceptance of face value and interest in a different form
of currency); Ricketts v. Hall & Long, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 249 (Payment
of less by delivery of obligation of third person); Trundle v. Riley,
56 Ky. (17 B. M.) 396 (Services by a jailor beyond those required by
law); Tomlin v. McChord's Adm., 29 Ky. (6 J. J. M.) 1 (substitution
of a new agreement containing some changes in terms); Peace v. Sten-
izet, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. M.) 449 (Promise to pay a definite amount on a
tort claim is sufficient to support a promise by the injured party).
(d) This statement is not in accord with the law of Kentucky.
Our Court has not seen fit to make a distinction between promises to
perform contractual duties owing to the promisee (Section 76-a) and
those owing to a third person. Neither the promise to perform an
existing contract with a third person, nor the performance of it, con-
stitutes sufficient consideration. Moore v. Kuster, 238 Ky. 292, 37 S. W.
(2d) 863 (Maker of note not bound where consideration was execution
of a bond by one who had already bound himself to execute such
bond); McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 (Winning of
race by jockey is not sufficient consideration for promise by third per.
son, since the promisee was under a duty to the owner of the horse to
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do what he did); Holloway's Assignee v. Rudy, 22 K. L. R. 1406, 60 S.
IV. 650 (Payment of debt by a surety is not sufficient consideration to
support a promise to Indemnify made by widow of insolvent principal);
Ford v, Crenshaw, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 68 (Completion of a building con-
tract will not support the promise of a third person to pay).
(e) A promise by an infant is sufficient consideration. If this
were not true, bilateral agreements by infants would be void instead
of voidable. The defense of infancy is not open to the other party.
Horney v. Downs, 209 Ky. 255, 272 S. W. 728; Younce v. Duty, 205 Ky.
274, 265 S. W. 776; Cannon v. Alsbury, 8 Ky. (1 A. X. M.) 76.
(f) This subsection states the law in Kentucky. It is illustrated
by the many cases allowing bonding or insurance companies to col-
lect premiums, where it is clear that the consideration for the promise
to pay premiums is a conditional promise by the company. Fidelity
and Deposit Co. v. Brown, 230 Ky. 534, 20 S. W. (2d) 284; Skaggs v.
Ferguson, 224 Ky. 775, 7 S. W. (2d) 213. It is said in Kernan v. Car-
ter, 31 K. L. R. 865, 104 S. W. 308, "A promise is a sufficient considera-
tion for a promise, though based upon a contingency."
However, if the condition in the promise is the wish or the desire
of the promisor or its happening subject to his whim, the promise may
be illusory and insufficient consideration under Section 79. supra.
(To be Continued.)
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